The well-known theorem of Dybvig, Ingersoll and Ross shows that the long zerocoupon rate can never fall. This result, which-although undoubtedly correct-has been regarded by many as counterintuitive and even pathological, stems from the implicit assumption that the long-term discount function has an exponential tail. We revisit the problem in the setting of modern interest rate theory, and show that if the long "simple" interest rate (or Libor rate) is finite, then this rate (unlike the zerocoupon rate) acts viably as a state variable, the value of which can fluctuate randomly in line with other economic indicators. New interest rate models are constructed, under this hypothesis, that illustrate explicitly the good asymptotic behaviour of the resulting discount bond system. The conditions necessary for the existence of such "hyperbolic" long rates turn out to be those of so-called social discounting, which allow for long-term cash flows to be treated as broadly "just as important" as those of the short or medium term. As a consequence, we are able to provide a consistent arbitrage-free valuation framework for the cost-benefit analysis and risk management of long-term social projects, such as those associated with sustainable energy, resource conservation, and climate change.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a class of models suitable for addressing various aspects of the interest rate risks associated with the valuation and appraisal of long-term social projects. The planning of such projects poses a major challenge to our understanding of the theory of interest rates. The issue is: how should we discount a set of cash flows occurring in the distant future in such a way that the resulting present value can be used rationally for the purpose of deciding whether or not to fund a long-term social project that produces these cash flows? If one uses an exponential discount factor, then a large cash flow occurring in the distant future may as a consequence be assigned what some might regard as an unfairly low present value, a value insufficient to justify the costs involved in funding the project. Or if the project is designed to prevent a large negative cash flow in the distant future, then with exponential discounting the present value of the loss one intends to prevent may seem disproportionately small in comparison with the cost of the prevention.
The matter is of a socio-political nature, and is not easily resolved. When one is considering the present value of benefits that will accrue to future generations, one cannot treat the problem as if it were that of finding the present value of a delayed benefit that will accrue to oneself. In other words, the discounting has to be carried out more as if one were a trustee for the yet unborn future. On the other hand, it is clearly too much to ask that one should live entirely for the sake of posterity, working away on projects for the benefit of the remote future while living a life of austerity in the present, so a compromise has to be reached. The compromise is called "social discounting". In practical terms this means using a discount function P 0t for t > 0 that falls off for large t not like P 0t ∼ e −rt for some "exponential" rate r > 0, but much more mildly, like P 0t ∼ (1 + λ −1 Lt) −λ for some power λ > 0 and some "hyperbolic" rate L > 0. In that case we say that P 0t is a social discount function, and that it is asymptotically of the generalised hyperbolic or tail-Pareto type.
But is it possible to develop consistent mathematical models for interest rates having such properties? Is it possible to construct a dynamical framework for the valuation of projects in situations where one of the main determinants of value is the discount factor being used? Can we allow for the fact that the discount factor may fluctuate in time in line with changing social attitudes or with the arrival of new information that may have a bearing on the balance of the allocation of resources to the present and the future?
Our goal is to provide the basis for a positive answer to these questions. The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we discuss the pros and cons of exponential discounting, and we present some of the arguments for social discounting. The exponential system is advantageous, in some contexts, on account of its simplicity, and the fact that it is time consistent. In Remark 1 we observe that if an arbitrage-free system of discount functions is time-consistent, then it is necessarily exponential, with a constant rate. In practical applications, we need to allow for the interest rate system to have stochastic dynamics, and to admit the input of an essentially arbitrary initial discount function. But in that case the discount function might still have an exponential tail. Arguments for social discounting fall in two categories. Firstly, we have normative arguments. These are moral, ethical, and political in character. Such arguments can be compelling, but are not universally supported, and tend to be difficult to formulate in a scientific language. The various normative arguments that have been proposed, however, do provide a mandate for the development of a theory of social discounting in a framework of sufficient rigour that its principles can be applied consistently in situations where they are needed. Secondly, there is a vein of argument maintaining that social discounting arises in some sense automatically as a byproduct of aggregative effects acting across society. Whether or not one can use arguments of an aggregative nature as a robust basis for the derivation of a figure for the socially efficient rate of discount is debatable; but there is little doubt that aggregative effects are important as part of the general argument that social discounting should be applied even in situations where a majority of the individuals of which a society is composed tend to be short-termists. In Remark 2 we present a simple but useful example of the aggregation effect, which also leads one in a natural way to certain important classes of social discount functions, namely those for which the asymptotic behaviour is of the tail-Pareto type mentioned above.
On the other hand, if one aggregates over the time preferences of a finite number of individuals each of whom is an exponential discounter, then the aggregate discount function is itself asymptotically exponential, and the resulting asymptotic rate is equal to the lowest of the various discount rates applied by the various individuals. This point, made by Weitzman (1998) in an influential paper, has been employed to argue that one can use exponential discounting in applications, and that the appropriate asymptotic rate should be the lowest among those in principle attainable. Weitzman's argument, however, which at first sight seems comforting to those who would like to motivate the use of a low exponential discount rate for the valuation of social projects, leads to a difficulty once one imposes the absence of arbitrage. In particular, absence of arbitrage in a deterministic interest-rate model implies that the long exponential rate of interest must be constant. In the situation where one considers the aggregation of a finite number of exponential discounters, this constant is indeed the lowest rate among the various rates being aggregated; but the result is true quite generally, and holds independently of any consideration of aggregation. In short, the long exponential rate has no dynamics. In the context of a general arbitrage-free stochastic interest rate model, it is likewise the case that the behavior of long exponential rate is severely constrained. Specifically, one has the so-called DIR theorem (Dybvig, Ingersoll & Ross 1996) : long exponential rates can never fall. The resulting degenerate behaviour of the long exponential rate leads to a serious complication in any attempt at the use of exponential discounting for long-term project valuation, for it implies that one cannot use the long exponential rate as a state variable. This seems to run contrary to intuition, for we would like to think that the long rate should fluctuate, should adjust to changing circumstance, should reflect the receipt of new information, should respond to innovation. In particular, we are unable to plan in a consistent way now for how we would react in the future if the long-term discount rate were to drop, or to hedge against that possibility. In this paper we show how the issue can be resolved by the use of social discounting. We shall argue that the long exponential rate is not the rate that one should be considering in the first place-that the long exponential rate should be modelled as taking the value zero, and that attention should be focussed instead on a long rate of interest suitable for the construction of dynamic models for social discounting.
With this programme in mind, in Section III we consider the valuation of long-term investment projects. We adopt a pricing kernel approach, under rather minimal assumptions, and look at the idealised situation in which one envisages a project leading to a single random real cash flow H T at some distant time T . The cash flow represents the benefit that results from the project. It is acknowledged that not all benefits to society are readily quantifiable, but this is a general feature of matters related to public expenditure, and will not be addressed here as such. The value of the project at any earlier time t ≥ 0 (where t = 0 is the present) is given by the pricing formula (8) . In the case of a unit cash flow we obtain the price P tT at time t of a unit discount bond that matures at T . In Section IV we define the various interest rate systems associated with the resulting discount bond system and discuss their relationship to one another. We introduce the exponential (or continuously compounded) rate R tT , the Libor (or simple) rate L tT , the short rate r t , the instantaneous forward rate f tT , the forward exponential rate R stT , and the forward Libor rate L stT . Finally, we introduce a family of "tail-Pareto" rates denoted L (λ) tT , indexed by a parameter λ ∈ (0, ∞). The tail-Pareto rates play a key role in the development of dynamical models for social discounting. In Section V we introduce the associated asymptotic rates: we write R t∞ for the long exponential rate, L t∞ for the long Libor rate, and L (λ) t∞ for the long tail-Pareto rate with index λ. We observe in Remark 3 that if R t∞ > 0, then L t∞ = ∞, whereas if L t∞ < ∞, then R t∞ = 0, and in Remark 4 that a similar observation holds in the case of tail-Pareto rates with various indices. In Propositions 1, 2, and 3 we recall the dynamical properties of long exponential rates and long forward exponential rates, framed in a way that makes it possible to compare the behaviour of these rates to that of the long Libor and long tail-Pareto rates, which we proceed to investigate in more detail. In particular, we show that, in contrast to the long exponential rates, the long Libor and tail-Pareto rates are fully dynamical-a property that might appropriately be called asymptotic freedom. This property is already evident in arbitrage-free deterministic models: in Propositions 4, 5, and 6, we show that the long exponential rate is constant in a deterministic model (whatever the initial term structure), whereas the long Libor and long tail-Pareto rates are variable, and indeed both determine and are determined by the freely specifiable initial term structure.
Finally, we consider the problem of determining the asymptotic conditions that have to be imposed on the pricing kernel to ensure that the resulting system of discount functions is socially efficient, and in Proposition 7 a solution to this problem is presented in the case of discount bond systems that are asymptotically of the Libor or tail-Pareto type.
We are therefore led to the interesting conclusion that to develop a consistent theory of social discounting in a stochastic setting it suffices to set the long exponential rate to zero, and to require that the pricing kernel should have asymptotic properties sufficient to ensure that the relevant long Libor or tail-Pareto rates are finite. Building on this principle we proceed in Section VI to construct some explicit examples of socially efficient interest rate models that are both fully dynamic and arbitrage-free. In particular, in Proposition 8 we present an example of a one-factor model driven by a positive martingale. The model contains two deterministic functions which can be chosen in such a way as to ensure that the relevant social discounting properties are in place. The long Libor rate can be worked out explicitly, and we show that it acts as a state variable for the model. In other words, discount bonds of all maturities can be expressed as functions of the long rate. Then in Proposition 9 we construct an explicit two-factor dynamical model for social discounting, in which both the short rate and the long rate act as state variables. Remarkably, the resulting bond prices turn out to be linear in the short rate, and inverse-linear in the long rate. As a consequence, the two-factor model is highly tractable, and hence suitable for consideration as a starting point for practical implementations, simulation studies, and scenario analysis.
II. SOCIAL DISCOUNTING
In a recent article in the Financial Times (Warrel 2013) , it is reported that Andrew Haldane, director of financial stability at the Bank of England, while addressing a conference on the role of higher education in boosting the economy, told delegates the following:
We know that financial markets discount rather too heavily projects with a long life that yield returns in the distant future, to the extent that some of those projects may not be initiated in the first place.
Haldane's remarks are indicative of the importance of the unresolved issues-and indeed, the ongoing debates-concerning the form of the discount function that should be used in the cost/benefit analysis of proposals for long-term projects carried out for the benefit of society. At the heart of the matter is the inadequacy of the standard discounted utility-ofconsumption model as a basis for rational decision making when the beneficiaries of future consumption are not the same as the beneficiaries of present consumption, and have needs that cannot be neglected. The use of the exponential discount function for this purpose, with a flat rate of discount, is problematic, since even for small values of the discount rate the corrosive effect of continuous compounding can reduce the present value of benefits secured for the distant future to virtually nothing. As a consequence, various alternative proposals as to how long-term discounting should be carried out have been put forward and put into practice. It seems, or so is it argued, that for social purposes some form of "hyperbolic" discounting is required, where the rate of discount applied is a decreasing function of the time interval over which the rate is applied, with the effect of enhancing the relative importance of benefits accruing to the future. But what is the justification for such an approach, and does it make good sense scientifically? Numerous authors have contributed to various aspects of this discussion, including for example Arrow (1995 Schelling (1995) , and Weitzman (1998 Weitzman ( , 2001 , to name a few.
The debate on the choice of the long-term discount function can be approached in various ways. For example, one might simply assume that the discount function is exponential, and let the problem be the determination of the rate. The choice of discount rate then becomes the lightning rod through which politically charged opinions are channeled. For sure, exponential discounting has its attractions-both on account of its mathematical simplicity, and on account of the fact that the exponential discount function has the privileged status of being "time consistent". Since the relevance of time consistency (or stationarity) is a contentious issue, we recall the argument. Let time 0 denote the present, and write P tT for the value at t ≥ 0 of a unit cash flow occurring at T > t. It is assumed that the initial discount function is known. For fixed t we assume that P tT is a continuous decreasing function of T and that lim T →∞ P tT = 0. We shall say that a system of discount functions is time-consistent (or stationary) if P tT = P t+y,T +y for T > t ≥ 0 and y ≥ −t.
Remark 1. (Stationary discount functions.) In the absence of arbitrage, a system of discount functions is time-consistent if and only if P tT = e
−r(T −t) for some constant r > 0.
Proof. By stationarity, we have P tT = P 0,T −t , and thus P tT = f (T − t) for some continuous decreasing function f : R + → [0, 1] satisfying f (0) = 1 and lim x→∞ f (x) = 0. Absence of arbitrage implies P tT = P 0T /P 0t , and thus f (T ) = f (T − t)f (t). We shall show that for some r > 0 it holds for any rational K that f (K) = exp(−rK). n . Finally, combining (i) and (ii), we have f (n/m) = f (1) n/m . Now define r = − ln f (1). Then f (n/m) = exp(−rn/m), and hence f (K) = exp(−rK) for all rational K > 0. We require r > 0 to ensure that lim x→∞ f (x) = 0. Since f (x) is continuous and f (K) = exp(−rK) for all rational K > 0, it follows that f (x) = exp(−rx) for all real x ≥ 0, and that concludes the proof. If one assumes that f (x) is differentiable, the argument simplifies somewhat: differentiating the relation f (T ) = f (T − t)f (t) on each side with respect to T and setting T = t, we obtain f ′ (t) = f ′ (0)f (t). Setting r = −f ′ (0) and using the stated conditions on f (x), we conclude that f (t) = e −rt for some r > 0.
But exponential discounting over the long term is problematic: even if agreement is reached on a choice of exponential discount factor appropriate for a particular period, the resulting discount for a longer period at the same rate may be too severe. This might lead to a situation where one approves a project producing a specified benefit to society in 200 years, and yet rejects a project producing essentially the same benefit to society in 300 years-which seems peculiar. Why should those living 200 years from now be treated as vastly more important than those living 300 years from now? Indeed, there is a school of thought dating at least back to Ramsey (1928) , represented more recently in Stern (2007) , that maintains that little or no "pure time discount" should be applied in intergenerational allocation problems-and that the only justification for the inclusion of a pure time discount in the decision-making process is to allow for the possibility that some calamity will prevent the benefit of the project from being realised. If one assumes that such a calamity, whatever form it may take, is unpredictable-a war, an epidemic, a natural disaster, or a political decision to abort the project-then the use of an exponential discount factor with a constant rate of discount to take that possibility into account is perhaps not unreasonable. Whether some given figure is the right one to use, or not, for the likelihood of calamity, can be debated. The long-term discounting arising from calamity risk is in our view analogous to the discounting arising in financial markets from credit risk, and thus separate from that arising from pure time preferences. Or to put the matter another way, calamity risk should be incorporated into the random variable describing the payoff of the project, and as such needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Alternatively, we can reject altogether the idea that the discount function should necessarily be exponential, and seek the form that the discount function should take. For maturities beyond the reach of the financial markets it is arguable that the form of the discount function is determined by the relative weight placed by society on the long term and short term benefits accruing to itself. It is then a characteristic of a responsible society that it will assign a reasonable balance in such a weighting, allowing for the fact that the future has no vote, and that the present must act in an appropriately fair and neutral way both on its own behalf and for that of the future. This point of view on the intergenerational allocation issue seems, in fact, to have rather wide support (see, e.g., Arrow 1995) .
Apart from such normative considerations, the view has also been put forward that social discounting might originate as a byproduct of the effects of aggregation. To see how this works, we construct the following model, which, despite its simplicity, has some surprising features. Let R be a random variable taking values in R + , and consider the random discount function {e −Rt } t>0 . We interpret R as the discount rate associated with an individual chosen at random in a heterogeneous population, and one can think of
as the "aggregate" discount function determined by the given population. Here µ(dr) = P (R ∈ dr) is the probability measure on R + associated with R. Therefore, R represents the diverse views held as to what the appropriate rate of discount should be, and the aggregate discount function obtained by averaging over the views of the various members of the population. There is, admittedly, no reason for insisting that individuals should have a constant exponential rate of discounting, except perhaps for time consistency at the individual level, but that is a simplifying assumption of this elementary model. Then depending on the distribution of R, we obtain the associated aggregate discount function. For example, if µ(dr) = i p i δ r i (dr), where δ r i (dr) is the Dirac measure centred at r i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and where p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n are nonnegative numbers satisfying i p i = 1, then P 0t = i p i e −r i t , and it follows by use of l'Hôpital's rule that
We see that the aggregation of any finite number of exponential discounters is asymptotically exponential, and that the asymptotic rate r ∞ is given by the minimum of the various individual rates under consideration. Weitzman (1998) argued on that basis that the fardistant future should be discounted at the lowest possible rate. On the other hand, if we model R by setting µ(dr) = 1{r ≥ 0}L −1 e −r/L dr for some mean rate L > 0, we find that
In other words, the effect of spreading the discount rate by use of an exponential distribution is that the aggregate discount function is of the so-called hyperbolic type. Equivalently, if we know that the population consists of exponential discounters, but if all we know of their views is that their mean rate of discount is L, then from an information-theoretic perspective the least-biased model for the discount function is given by (3) . As another example of such probability-weighted discounting (Brody & Hughston 2001 Weitzman 2001 ), consider the case for which R has a gamma distribution:
where θ, λ > 0. A calculation shows that the discount function takes the form of a Pareto tail distribution, given by P 0t = [θ/(θ + t)] λ . Then if we set θ = λ/L we obtain
Thus we obtain a two-parameter family of discount functions of the so-called generalised hyperbolic type (Harvey 1986 (Harvey , 1994 Loewenstein & Prelec 1992) . We have a flat term structure with a constant annualised rate of interest L, assuming compounding at the frequency λ over the life of the bond (λ need not be an integer). For example, if λ = 2, then for a bond of maturity t we apply simple discounting at the annualised rate L over a period of length 1 2 t, and then compound this by applying the same discount factor a second time to obtain P 0t . The case λ = 1 (hyperbolic discounting) is that of a flat rate on a simple basis, whereas the limit λ → ∞ gives a flat rate on a continuously compounded basis. For fixed λ, short-maturity bonds are compounded at a high frequency per annum than long-maturity bonds. For a given interest rate L and a given maturity t, the effect of increasing the λ is to deepen the discount. Note that the generalised hyperbolic system (which has a fixed compounding frequency per bond lifetime for all discount bonds) is distinct from the so-called zero coupon system (which has a fixed compounding rate per annum for all discount bonds, and is equivalent to the exponential system, as we indicate in Appendix A).
The interpretation of the discount function as a tail distribution can be set in a rather more general context, including the examples cited above a special cases, as follows:
Remark 2. On a probability space (Ω, F , P) let the random discount rate R satisfy R > 0. Then there exists a random time τ such that for all t ∈ R + it holds that
Proof. Let Z be a standard exponentially-distributed random variable with the property that R and Z are independent, and set τ = Z/R. Then, writing 1{·} for the indicator function, we have
where in going from the second to the third term we have conditioned with respect to R.
If R admits exponential moments, and thus is in some sense "small" in its tail distribution, then τ = Z/R will tend to have a "heavy" tail distribution (Ç inlar 2011). This explains how the effective discount function that results when we aggregate over a spread of exponential discounters can take the form of a heavy-tailed discount function. Whether social discounting can be justified entirely on the basis of aggregative arguments is an open question; it seems that somewhere along the line (implicitly or otherwise) some version of the normative argument has to be brought into play-that it is ultimately a positive decision that we have to make as a society to put social discounting into action. Nevertheless, aggregation does have the effect of enhancing arguments in favour of the use of social discounting in the decision-making processes leading up to the funding of a long-term project. In particular, aggregation of the diverse views on the rate at which exogenous calamity might occur will result, by the argument above, in a social discount function, rather than an exponential discount function, for that element of the overall discount, hence favouring the development of longer-term projects more than it would otherwise. A rather explicit example of the prescriptive use of a social discount function can be found in The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government, Annex 6, issued by HM Treasury (2003 edition, updated July 2011), which presents a table of the relevant STPRs ("social time preference rates") to be used for various time periods in the appraisal of proposals for social projects in the United Kingdom. The prescribed rates (which are quoted as usual on an exponential basis) range from a flat 3.5% for periods up to 30 years, to 3% for periods from 31 to 75 years, then 2.5% for 76 to 125 years, and so on, levelling out flat again at 1% for 301 years or more. The method of calculation used to arrive at these figures, which is briefly described in Annex 6, and is based on a version of the well-known formula of Ramsey (1928) , includes in the calculation of the 30 year STPR the following ingredients: a catastrophe rate of about 1%, a pure time preference rate of about 0.5%, and an elasticity-adjusted growth rate of about 2%, making a total of 3.5%; and in item 10 (under the heading "long-term discount rates") one is told:
Where the appraisal of a proposal depends materially upon the discounting of effects in the very long term, the received view is that a lower discount rate for the longer term (beyond 30 years) should be used.
III. VALUATION OF LONG-TERM PROJECTS
To pursue matters further, we proceed to consider in general terms the problem of project valuation and appraisal, with a view to the case where the benefits of the project accrue in the long term. Our goal is that of isolating those aspects of the problem that are associated with how one models the long rate of interest. We take the view that the cost/benefit analysis and risk management of investments in long-term projects can be formulated within the same framework as that used for financial modelling in general. This may involve various idealisations and extensions of concepts and modelling techniques developed for the analysis of mature markets; but it seems that any endeavour to deal with long term financing will involve some such idealisations and extensions-and if one makes assumptions that are precise rather than vague, this should not be regarded as a drawback.
We fix a probability space (Ω, F , P) with filtration {F t } t≥0 . Here P denotes the realworld measure, and the filtration satisfies the "usual conditions". Equalities and inequalities between random variables hold P-almost-surely. Price processes are modelled by càdlàg semimartingales. Generally, we shall assume that prices are expressed in real terms. To ensure the absence of arbitrage we assume the existence of a pricing kernel {π t } t≥0 satisfying (i) π t ≥ 0 for t ≥ 0, (ii) E [ π t ] < ∞ for t ≥ 0, and (iii) lim inf t→∞ E[π t ] = 0, with the property that if an asset with value process {S t } t≥0 delivers a single random cash flow H T at T , and derives its value from that cash flow, then its value at time t ≥ 0 is given by
where E t [ · ] denotes conditional expectation with respect to F t . In the case of a long-term social project, it may not be obvious that the valuation principles outlined above are fully applicable, since the idealisations involved extend beyond the domain of validity of asset pricing theory as it is presently understood. If a project is on a sufficiently large scale that its success or otherwise would have a nontrivial (rather than merely perturbative) effect on the economy, then one would probably take the view that the use of a linear pricing operator is inappropriate. Climate change projects might fall into that category. Nevertheless, we put these concerns to one side, and pursue the problem of long-term project valuation in the spirit indicated, with the hope of gaining at least some insight into the issues that arise in the appraisal of proposals for such projects, and their management once underway. The difficulties, such as they are, are already apparent in the case of a project that generates a single payoff H T at some distant time T . The cash flows involved with realistic projects are more complicated, but the main conceptual issues are present in this simplified version of the problem. One has to model H T , one has to model π t , and one has to model P. Finally, the filtration has to be modelled in such a way that the relevant information flows make sense. It goes without saying that uncertainties arise when one attempts to model the probability assignments associated with any aspect of the distant future.
IV. INTEREST RATE SYSTEMS
For an overview of the application of pricing kernel models to interest rate theory, see Hunt & Kennedy (2004) . In the case of a so-called discount bond (or zero-coupon bond) that generates a single real cash flow of unity at T , the price at t is given, according to (8) , by
for t < T and P tT = 0 for t ≥ T , with lim t→T P tT = 1. Then for each fixed T ≥ 0 the price process {P tT } is defined for all t ≥ 0. The initial bond price is P 0T . As t approaches T , the price approaches unity, then drops abruptly to zero at T when the principal of unity is paid out in the form of a single cash flow-and thereafter the bond has value zero. The convention we adopt is slightly different from what one often sees in the literature, where the discount bond is defined to have value unity at maturity. Asymptotic properties of the discount bond system are best pursued by consideration of the various interest rates associated with it. It may be helpful therefore if we recall the relevant definitions (see, e.g., Brigo & Mercurio 2007 , Filipović 2009 ). The so-called continuously-compounded (or exponential) rate R tT , expressed on an annualised basis, is defined for 0 ≤ t < T by the relation
If for fixed t the limit R tt = lim x→0 R t,t+x exists then {R tT } can be defined to include the zero-tenor limit as well, and we call r t = R tt the short rate. If the discount bond system is differentiable with respect to the maturity index in such a way that instantaneous forward rate f tT = −∂ T ln P tT is defined for 0 ≤ t < T , and if f tt = lim x→0 f t,t+x exists, then f tt = r t . Going forward it will be useful in certain contexts to assume the existence of the short rate {r t } and instantaneous forward rate system {f tT }, and that these processes are càdlàg semimartingales. The relation between the exponential rates and the instantaneous forward rates is then given by f tT = R tT + (T − t)∂ T R tT or equivalently
More generally, for 0 ≤ s < t < T let us write P stT for the price agreed at s for purchase on a forward basis at t of a T -maturity discount bond. It is well known that the absence of arbitrage implies that P stT = P sT /P st . Given the forward price P stT , one defines the associated forward rate R stT by the relation P stT = exp [−(T − t)R stT ]. It follows from the absence of arbitrage that
which expresses the forward rate as a weighted difference between the rate to T and the rate to t. One can check that if the instantaneous forward rate system exists, then lim x→0 R t,T,T +x = f tT , justifying the interpretation of f tT as the rate set at t on a forward basis for short term borrowing at T . Next, we introduce the so-called Libor rates (or "simple" rates) L tT for 0 ≤ t < T , which are quoted on an annualised basis, by setting
For the associated forward Libor rates we have the relation
where L stT is the Libor rate set on a forward basis at s for the period from t to T . One can check that L tT and R tT are close for short tenor T − t, and that the same is true for the forward rates L stT and R stT . In particular, if the short rate and the instantaneous forward rate system exist, then lim x→0 L t,t+x = r t , and lim x→0 L t,T,T +x = f tT . Thus it is immaterial whether r t and f tT are defined as limits of exponential rates or as limits of Libor rates. In general, the relation between L tT and R tT is tenor dependent. More specifically, we have:
The implication of this tenor dependence is that while for fixed finite tenor the relation between the Libor rate system and the exponential system is monotonic, this ceases to be the case in the limit of large maturity. It will be useful in what follows to introduce a parametric family of rates having this property, which we call generalised hyperbolic (or tail-Pareto) rates. The tail-Pareto rates are important in the development of general arbitrage-free interest rate models for social discounting. We fix a real number λ > 0 and define the generalised hyperbolic rate L (λ)
tT with index λ by setting
The Libor system is evidently given by λ = 1, and the exponential system can be regarded as the limiting case λ = ∞. For finite T , one can verify that the relation between any two of these systems (including the exponential system) is monotonic. If we set t = 0 and assume that {L
0T } is constant in T , one is led back to the generalised hyperbolic discount function (5) . Thus one sees that interest rate systems for which the tail-Pareto rates are asymptotically well behaved (e.g., bounded from above and below) may make viable candidates for consideration as dynamic models for social discounting
V. ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES OF INTEREST RATES
With these facts at hand, we are in a position to investigate the asymptotic properties of interest rates in more detail. The situation of long rates is more complicated than that of short rates, since various long rates can be defined and we need to understand the relation of these rates to one another. It has usually been assumed in the literature that for fixed t the exponential rate should converge for large T to a definite limit. In fact, the theory of the long exponential rate can be developed in a more general setting (Goldammer & Schmock 2012) , where this condition is relaxed and the long exponential rate is defined by
In the construction of specific models, one usually introduces additional structure sufficient to ensure convergence of the exponential long rate, and indeed there is no reason to suppose on an economic basis that one should do otherwise-but the theory is more transparent in the general setting with no convergence assumptions. This principle carries through to the case of social discounting, and we are led to define the long Libor rate by
The limiting rates are understood in all cases as taking values in the extended real numbers. Then as a consequence of (14) we obtain:
More generally, let us define
for λ ∈ (0, ∞), and set L 
We conclude that term structure models can be categorised according to their asymptotic structure, and in particular that models for which the long exponential rate is finite and nonvanishing are distinct, for example, from those for which the long Libor rate is finite and nonvanishing-which are distinct again from those for which the tail-Pareto rates are finite and nonvanishing. This leads us to reconsider the status of the well-known theorem of Dybvig et al. (1996) . The DIR theorem shows that the dynamics of long exponential rates are severely constrained. But what if the long Libor rate is finite? Is it similarly constrained? This we proceed to investigate. The continuous-time version of the DIR theorem, which applies to all arbitrage-free interest rate models, can be stated as follows. Proposition 1. (Long exponential rates can never fall.) If R t∞ < ∞ for all t ≥ 0, then for all s, t such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t it holds that R t∞ ≥ R s∞ .
We note therefore that if the long exponential rate is initially greater than zero, then the long Libor rate is infinite for all time. It should be remarked that Dybvig et al. (1996) work with so-called zero-coupon rates, rather than exponential rates. In Appendix A we recall the relation of the zero-coupon system to the exponential system. In fact, the relation is monotonic, even at infinite maturity, so it suffices to work with one or the other. The exponential system is easier to work with, which may be why later authors prefer to rephrase the results of Dybvig et al. (1996) in the language of that system. For the benefit of the reader we present a concise proof of the DIR theorem, under minimal assumptions, in Appendix B.
When it comes to the properties of long forward exponential rates, there are two cases to consider. Recall that R stT represents the forward rate agreed at s for a loan extending over the period from t to T . Case 1 is the situation where s and t are fixed, and we allow T to get large. Case 2 is the situation where we fix both s and the tenor x = T − t, and we allow t and T to get large. In case 1, it follows from equation (12) that R st∞ = R s∞ . Then we can apply Proposition 1 to deduce the following: Proposition 2. (Long forward exponential rates can never fall: case 1.) If R t∞ < ∞ for all t ≥ 0, then for all s 1 , s 2 , t such that 0 ≤ s 1 ≤ s 2 ≤ t it holds that R s 2 t∞ ≥ R s 1 t∞ .
Case 2, which is considered in Dybvig et al. (1996) and Hubalek et al. (2002) , is a little more subtle. One sees intuitively that for large t the tenor is relatively speaking small, and thus can be treated in the limit as an infinitesimal. Thus we can argue that the instantaneous forward rate f st should coincide with the fixed-tenor forward rate R stT for large t, large T = t + x, and fixed tenor x. More precisely, setting f s∞ = lim sup t→∞ f st one finds that for any finite x > 0 it holds that lim sup t→∞ R st,t+x = f s∞ , and we have:
To get a better sense of the asymptotic properties of exponential rates implied by the DIR theorem, it is useful to examine the case of a deterministic interest rate model. In fact, the arbitrage-free condition results in a strong constraint on the resulting long-rate process:
Proposition 4. In a deterministic interest-rate model, the long exponential rate is constant.
Proof. By the definition of exponential rates we have P tT = exp[−(T − t)R tT ] for 0 ≤ t < T < ∞ and P 0t = exp[−tR 0t ] for t ≥ 0. In the absence of arbitrage, in the case of a deterministic interest-rate system we have P tT = P 0T /P 0t . It follows that
Writing R 0∞ = lim sup T →∞ R 0T , we see that R t∞ = R 0∞ for all t ≥ 0.
On the other hand, in the case of a deterministic social discount function the behaviour of the associated long rate of interest is completely different. We have:
Proposition 5. In a deterministic interest-rate system, if the long Libor rate is initially finite, then it is finite for all time, and is given by
Proof. By the definition of the Libor (or simple) interest-rate system we have the relations P tT = 1/[1 + (T − t)L tT ] for 0 ≤ t < T < ∞ and P 0t = 1/[1 + tL 0t ] for t ≥ 0. Absence of arbitrage in a deterministic interest-rate system implies that P tT = P 0T /P 0t . It follows that
If the initial long Libor rate
One sees that the Libor system is asymptotically free in the sense that the long-rate process is freely specifiable. The long-rate process carries the full information of the initial term structure, which is all there is to know in a deterministic model. More generally, we have:
In a deterministic interest-rate system, if the long tail-Pareto rate of index λ is initially finite and nonvanishing, then it is finite and nonvanishing for all time, and is given by L
0∞ . We are thus led to ask for conditions on the pricing kernel in a general stochastic setting sufficient to ensure that the resulting interest-rate system is asymptotically tail-Pareto with index λ ∈ (0, ∞). This notion can be formalised by the following: 
Proof. To establish the inequality on the left-hand side of (21) we note that by condition (a) of Definition 1 we have lim inf T →∞ T λ π T > 0, and hence E t [lim inf T →∞ T λ π T ] > 0, for t ≥ 0, which implies by the conditional Fatou lemma that lim inf T →∞ T λ E t [π T ] > 0, and therefore lim inf T →∞ T λ P tT > 0. To establish the inequality on the right-hand side of (21), we observe that lim inf
where the first inequality in (22) follows by Fatou's lemma and the tower property, and the second inequality follows by condition (b) of Definition 1. It follows then that (21) holds, or equivalently that the long tail-Pareto rate satisfies 0 < L (λ)
t∞ < ∞ for all t ≥ 0.
In fact, the long tail-Pareto rate process takes the form L (λ) t∞ = λ(π t /θ t ) 1/λ , where the process {θ t } t≥0 defined by θ t = lim inf T →∞ E t [T λ π T ] is a strictly positive supermartigale.
VI. INTEREST RATE MODELS FOR SOCIAL DISCOUNTING
It turns out that one can construct a set of rather explicit examples of dynamic models admitting socially efficient discounting. These examples arise as variants of the so-called "rational" models that arise in the Rutkowski 1997 ). For simplicity, we consider a hyperbolic long-rate structure, corresponding to the case λ = 1. Generalisation to the tail-Pareto case λ ∈ (0, ∞) is straightforward. Let us write Γ + for the space of strictly positive functions f : R + → R + \ {0} such that {f t } t≥0 ∈ C 1 (R + ) and lim inf t→∞ f t = 0. The derivative of f will be denoted f ′ . We fix a probability space (Ω, F , P) with filtration {F t } and let {M t } be a positive martingale normalised to unity at t = 0. Let {a t }, {b t } be elements of Γ + satisfying lim inf t→∞ ta t = a, lim inf t→∞ tb t = b for a, b ∈ R + such that a + b > 0. Let the initial discount function P 0t = a t + b t be given for t ≥ 0 as an input to the model. 
or alternatively the long Libor rate, given by
Proof. Under the stated assumptions we find that the discount bond system takes the form
A calculation shows that the short rate r t = −(∂ u P tu )| u=t is given by (23) , and that the long rate L t∞ = 1/ lim sup T →∞ T P tT is given by (24) . Since r t and L t∞ are rational functions of M t , we can invert these relations to obtain M t as a function of r t or as a function of L t∞ , hence allowing us to express P tT as a function of r t or as a function of L t∞ . In fact, we find that the discount bond price, when expressed as a function of the short rate, takes the form
and when it is expressed as a function of the long rate, takes the form
Thus we deduce that P tT is linear in r t and inverse-linear in L t∞ .
It may seem a little artificial to have the entire term structure driven by a single rate, but this is an artifact of the one-factor setting, and is a feature of many interest rate models. Indeed, whether or not this particular model is useful in applications, it does establish the fact that one can construct fully dynamic arbitrage-free term-structure models admitting a long-rate state variable, and it seems to be a characteristic property of the theory of social discounting that this possibility is admitted. Note that we have not assumed that the functions {a t }, {b t }, {ta t }, and {tb t } converge for large t ; in practical examples we usually would, but the construction above illustrates the fact that the theory carries through without such an assumption. Likewise, we have not assumed that {a t } and {b t } are decreasing, so in principle the short rate and the long Libor rate are able to assume negative values, which in a theory of real interest rates is not unwarranted. On the other hand, for applications to nominal interest rate systems one can require that {a t } and {b t } should be decreasing, in which case interest rates are positive, and the pricing kernel necessarily converges.
As a somewhat more realistic dynamical model of the term structure, an explicit example of an arbitrage-free two-factor state-variable model based on both the short rate and the long rate can be constructed as follows. Let {M t } and {N t } be a pair of positive martingales normalised to unity at t = 0. Let {a t }, {b t }, {c t } be elements of Γ + satisfying lim inf t→∞ ta t = a, lim inf t→∞ tb t = b, lim inf t→∞ tc t = c for finite a, b, c such that a + b + c > 0. Let the initial term structure P 0t = a t + b t + c t be given for t ≥ 0. Then we have:
(Existence of long-rate/short-rate two-factor state-variable models.) The pricing kernel defined by π t = a t +b t M t +c t N t determines an arbitrage-free two-factor interest rate model, for which the state variables include the short rate, given by
and the long simple rate, given by
Proof. Under the stated assumptions we find that the discount bond system is given by
and a calculation establishes that r t is of the form (28) , and L t∞ is of the form (29) . Since r t and L t∞ are rational functions of M t and N t , we can invert these relations to obtain M t and N t in terms of r t and L t∞ , thus allowing us to express P tT in terms of r t and L t∞ .
In fact, we find that the discount bond price takes the following form when it is expressed as a function of the long rate and the short rate:
where the three deterministic coefficients appearing above are given by
and
It is interesting to observe that the discount function is linear in the short rate and inverse linear in the long rate. This can be compared to the single-factor model, where the discount function can be expressed either as a linear function of the short rate or as an inverse-linear function of the long rate. It is remarkable that such a simple expression emerges for the bond price in the two-factor model, and it will be evident that an n-factor version of the model can be developed by the same approach. In the general case, the bond price can be expressed as a function of the short rate, the long rate, and one or more intermediate rates. It should be emphasised, finally, that while the theory that we have described has been constructed with a view to applications to long-term social projects, the resulting models are in principle applicable to medium-term matters as well-for example, to pension fund and insurance valuation and solvency considerations, which tend to be outside of the immediate reach of the financial markets but are certainly in need of sensible regulation and risk management. The same might be said to apply to certain categories of public works projects.
one sees that R t∞ = κ ln(1 + κ −1 Z (κ) t∞ ). From a mathematical perspective, the exponential system is the more natural of the two systems. For instance, the expressions for forward rates are linear in the case of exponential rates. We mention the zero-coupon system here because this is the system used in the original proof of the DIR theorem. In fact, Dybvig et al. (1996) frame their argument in terms of zero-coupon rates (with unit compounding) in a discrete-time setting, and do not mention the exponential system. The approach taken in this appendix has been to develop the relation between the exponential system and the zero-coupon system in sufficient detail to enable statements regarding exponential rates in the main body of the paper to be translatable by the reader into relations concerning zerocoupon rates, thus making the connection with Dybvig et al. (1996) . We remark, finally, that although there is a superficial resemblance between the zero-coupon rates defined by (A1) and the generalised hyperbolic rates defined by (15) , these systems are quite distinct.
Appendix B: The Dybvig-Ingersoll-Ross theorem
We present in this appendix a self-contained proof of the Dybvig-Ingersoll-Ross (DIR) theorem for long zero-coupon rates. In what follows we require the conditional forms of Fatou's lemma and Hölder's inequality. For completeness, we recall the relevant statements in the form they are needed. On a probability space (Ω, F , P), let G be a sub-σ-algebra of F . The conditional Fatou lemma states that if {X n } n∈N is a sequence of positive random variables such that E[X n ] < ∞ for all n ∈ N then
For the conditional Hölder inequality we have the following. Let X and Y be random variables such that E[|X| p ] < ∞ and E[|Y | q ] < ∞, where p, q satisfy 1 ≤ p < ∞, 1 ≤ q < ∞ and p −1 + q −1 = 1. Then
Let us proceed to the DIR theorem. We fix (Ω, F , P), where P is the real-world measure, together with a market filtration {F t } t≥0 . Equalities and inequalities hold P-almost-surely. We fix the numeraire currency and let {P tT } be a system of discount bond prices satisfying P tT > 0 and lim t→T P tT = 1 for 0 ≤ t < T < ∞, and P tT = 0 for t ≥ T . The bond with maturity T has initial value P 0T ; at maturity it delivers a unit cash flow and its value drops to zero. We assume the existence of a pricing kernel {π t } satisfying π t ≥ 0, E [ π t ] < ∞, and lim inf t→∞ E[π t ] = 0, with the property that for each T > 0 the process {M tT } defined by M tT = π t P tT for t < T and M tT = π T for t ≥ T is a martingale. We define the exponential discount rate R tT by equation (10) . The associated exponential long rate R t∞ is defined by equation (16), and we shall assume that R t∞ < ∞ for all t ≥ 0. For convenience, we set X tT = exp(−R tT ), or equivalently P tT = (X tT ) T −t , and write X t∞ = exp(−R t∞ ). It follows that R t∞ ≥ R s∞ for 0 ≤ s ≤ t if and only if X t∞ ≤ X s∞ , which holds if and only if E (X t∞ − X s∞ ) + = 0.
Finally, we define the zero-coupon rate Z
tT for compounding frequency κ by (A2), and we observe that Z (κ) t∞ is finite if and only if the long exponential rate R t∞ is finite, and that the relation between these rates is monotonic. Thus, for all s, t such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t it holds that Z 
